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Semmy Lasco Kavinga v The People Appeal No 51/2018 (21 August 2019)
O’Brien Kaaba 1
Facts
The appellant served as a pastor or apostle at the Spirit of Christ Fellowship church in Lusaka.
He was convicted by the Subordinate Court on one count of rape, one count of attempted rape
and two counts of indecent assault involving three family members. The crimes had a religious
dimension as the appellant committed the crimes on the pretext of removing bad omen from
the victims. Upon conviction, the magistrate referred his case to the High Court for sentencing.
The High Court sentenced him to prison terms ranging from three years to 25 years with hard
labour, to run concurrently. Unhappy with the outcome, the appellant appealed against his
conviction only to the Court of Appeal.
Holding
The Court of Appeal considered the sentence inadequate and shocking. This was because the
appellant was a religious leader who betrayed the trust reposed in him by the victims. Because
of this, the Court of Appeal decided there was need for a stiffer punishment. It decided to
interfere with the decision of the High Court and instead sentenced the appellant to 45 years’
imprisonment with hard labour on count 1, 40 years with hard labour on count 2, 20 years with
hard labour on counts 3 and 4 each. The court further ordered that these sentences should run
consecutively (one after the other) on account that they were separate offences. The Court
effectively sentenced him to 105 years’ imprisonment with hard labour.
Significance
The law on sentencing in Zambia is to a great extent chaotic and in disarray. No clear standards
are set by the superior courts to guide lower courts and litigants. Often the sentences are at
variance with constitutional norms and there has been no sustained effort to align the law of
sentencing with constitutional standards, save for a few cases concerning corporal punishment.
Somehow, a judicial culture has evolved and continues to grow of sentencing people without
regard for constitutional norms. Yet the constitution is the supreme law, the ultimate source of
all law and ought to permeate all laws and administrative practices in the state. Article 1(1) of
the Zambian Constitution categorically states that the constitution is supreme and overrides all
laws and practices. Article 1(3) makes it clear that ‘This Constitution shall bind all persons in
Zambia, State organs and State institutions.’ This includes the judiciary and how it sentences
persons convicted even of the most heinous crimes. Offenders are not taken outside the ambit
of constitutional norms by virtue of their crimes.
It is contended that the sentencing of the appellant in this case to a cumulative 105 years’
imprisonment is unconstitutional as it offends fundamental constitutional norms and rights.
The sentence nowhere reflects constitutional norms. Yet the courts cannot just ignore or wish
away the constitution and simply sentence someone based on arbitrary personal shock, no
matter how terrible the crime is. As Devenish has argued about the import of constitutional
norms:
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The fundamental rights provisions are more than mere requirements against which
statutory enactments are tested for validity. The Constitution envisages that the
compendium of values contained in it will be all-pervasive in all spheres of life
regulated by the law and administrative agencies, and will be the measure against which
all law and conduct is tested. 2
In exercise of their power to sentence offenders, Courts have a duty to ensure their sentences
are consistent with constitutional standards. Constitutional norms should inform court
sentencing practice.
First, the 105-year prison term is a violation of article 15 of the Zambian constitution, which
states that ‘a person shall not be subject to torture, or to inhuman or degrading punishment or
other like treatment.’ The right is couched in absolute terms and does not permit any
exceptions. In sentencing the appellant to 105 years, in a country with life expectancy hovering
around 50 years, that would have required the appellant to live at least two lives to satisfy the
penalty. This effectively meant that he was given a life sentence. His whole natural life would
expire in prison. A prison sentence that forecloses the possibility of reform and reintegration
into the community is manifestly inhuman and degrading.
An interesting illustrative case is that of Vinter and Others v The United Kingdom (Applications
Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10) (9 July 2013) determined by the European Court of Human
Rights. The case was brought by three applicants against the UK challenging their mandatory
life sentences for the offenses of murder. The Challenge was premised on article 3 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (on which
the Zambian Bill of Rights is based), couched as follows: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ As can be seen, Article 3 is framed
similarly to article 15 of the Zambian constitution.
In determining the legality of the life sentences, the Court distinguished between three types of
life sentences, as follows:
(i) a life sentence with eligibility for release after a minimum period had been served;
(ii) a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (that
is, a sentence which is provided for in law, but which requires a judicial decision before
it can be imposed); and
(iii) a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (that
is, a sentence which is set down in law for a particular offence and which leaves a judge
no discretion as to whether to impose it or not).
The Court considered the first type of life sentence acceptable as it is reducible, but not the
other two. The Court held that by imposing irreducible mandatory life sentences on the three
applicants, the UK was in violation of article 3. This is notwithstanding the possibility of
Executive clemency as that is capricious and not predictable nor is it based on the prisoner’s
capacity for reform.
The point is that an irreducible life sentence leaves the person with no hope for the future and
nothing significant to live for apart from sustaining his/biological life. The rationale for this
was perhaps best explained by Chief Justice Mahomed of the Namibian Supreme Court in the
case of Lukas Tcoeib v The State SA/4/93 (1996):
2
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But, however relevant such considerations may be, there is no escape from the
conclusion that an order deliberately incarcerating a citizen for the rest of his or her
natural life severely impacts upon much of what is central to the enjoyment of life itself
in any civilized community and can therefore only be upheld if it is demonstrably
justified. In my view, it cannot be justified if it effectively amounts to a sentence which
locks the gates of the prison irreversibly for the offender without any prospect whatever
of any lawful escape from that condition for the rest of his or her natural life and
regardless of any circumstances which might subsequently arise. Such circumstances
might include sociological and psychological re-evaluation of the character of the
offender which might destroy the previous fear that his or her release after a few years
might endanger the safety of others or evidence which might otherwise show that the
offender has reached such an advanced age or become so infirm and sick or so repentant
about his or her past, that continuous incarceration of the offender at State expense
constitutes a cruelty which can no longer be defended in the public interest. To insist,
therefore, that regardless of the circumstances, an offender should always spend the
rest of his natural life in incarceration is to express despair about his future and to
legitimately induce within the mind and the soul of the offender also a feeling of such
despair and helplessness. 3
The second point is that the sentence of 105 years, considering that it effectively means the
appellant would spend the rest of his natural life in prison, is a violation of human dignity.
Article 8 of the Constitution lists ‘human dignity’ 4 among the national values. Article 9 of the
constitution is categorical that the national values are binding and shall be considered in
interpreting the constitution, enactment and interpretation of legislation, and development and
implementation of state policy. 5 Human dignity is an elusive concept not susceptible of an
easy definition. But what is clear is that the doctrine of human dignity asserts that ‘every human
being counts; that every human being has infinite value, regardless of his or her personal
circumstances or actions.’ 6 Human dignity thrives in personal freedom. When freedom is taken
away, dignity is threatened. It is in freedom that the human being can thrive and fulfil their
potential. As Ackerman J in Ferreira v Levin No and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell
NO and Others (CCT5/95)[1995] ZACC 13; 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) stated: ‘Human dignity has
little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not
possible. Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and
dignity are inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity.’
Similarly, to imprison a person without the possibility of regaining their freedom again, as did
the Court of Appeal in this case, is to deny the appellant his dignity.
In the case of Namibia, for example, Chief Justice Mahomed indicated that such a sentence
would be unconstitutional for offending human dignity: ‘It seems to me that the sentence of
life imprisonment in Namibia can therefore not be constitutionally sustainable if it effectively
amounts to an order throwing the prisoner into a cell for the rest of the prisoner's natural life as
if he was a 'thing' instead of a person without any continuing duty to respect his dignity (which
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would include his right not to live in despair and helplessness and without any hope of release,
regardless of the circumstances).’ 7
Third, the constitution empowers the Courts with power to Africanise or Zambianise the law
of sentencing but the opportunities, as in this case, are never seized. Article 7 (d) of the
Constitution recognizes customary law as a source of law while article 118(2)(a) empowers the
courts to promote alternative forms of dispute resolution, including usage of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms. Yet the Courts, in sentencing, seem oblivious to these provisions. No
effort is made to apply any traditional thought patterns in the sentencing process. It appears
that the judiciary in general is still trapped in William Church’s criticism of the ambivalence
created in the early Zambian lawyers trained in English law:
Because the legal training was relatively remote from the practical circumstances faced
daily in Zambia, the substantive legal consciousness the training was designed to
promote tended to become fixed as of the point of formal training, unable to grow easily
in the Zambian surroundings of the new lawyer. When legal understanding thus
becomes fixed and unchanging, two things happen. One is caused in part by the fact
that it is precisely the past, though alien, training that is perceived- accurately enough,
usually- as the recipient’s ticket to professional esteem and advancement: the more
remote, and hence vulnerable, that training is, the more obdurately it must be clung to
in defence of position, for to concede doubt over the relevance of the training or the
authority of the law learned is to challenge the whole basis of the stature conferred by
the foreign degree or certificate. The other result is that, because the fixed
understanding of the law necessarily recedes and diminishes as time goes by it is
incomplete. In such circumstances it is natural that the lawyer concerned will not feel
sufficient mastery even over the foreign law to deviate from it with confidence. When
a partially trained lawyer is confronted with a system of the size and complexity of the
English common law, his typical reaction is one of respect and deference. When he
knows it better he may perceive possibilities for improvement and become willing to
try to change it or even consciously to disregard it, but until then he is much more likely
to approach it with diffidence. 8
There is very little in the current law of sentencing that mirrors African philosophical views
about punishment, despite the Constitution clothing the judges with powers to shape the law
contextually. Judges have a constitutional duty and mandate to develop contextually and
culturally relevant jurisprudence. One of the traditional concepts the Courts could explore in
sentencing is the concept of Ubuntu. The concept of Ubuntu is widespread in Sab-Sharan
Africa and is considered to have been at the heart of traditional moral consciousness. It denotes
that people are interconnected and accomplish full humanness and happiness through
cultivating mutually beneficial relationships. It is a concept that disavows self-centeredness
and embraces the inter-connectedness of human beings, that is, ‘a person is a person through
other persons.’ 9 The concept of Ubuntu is a moral exhortation to nurture one’s humanness,
personhood, or virtue, through social and sympathetic communal relationships. 10 In a sense,
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Ubuntu could be the potential for being fully human. In the ubuntu sense the humanness of a
person is not static but dependent on a person’s moral disposition and qualities. A person’s
humanness, therefore, can fluctuate from the lowest (of being as good as a beast) to the
highest. 11 It is this moral quality that separates humans from beasts. Where a person lives in
constant harmony with other human beings, his or her humanness is elevated.
In a sense, Ubuntu can be seen as a transcendental call towards common interests, to forego
self-centeredness. It is a call towards the community, to cultivate relations of mutual support
for the of each of the people a person lives in community with. 12 Former South African
Constitutional Court judge, Yvonne Mokgoro, summarized the concept of Ubuntu as follows:
Generally ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it translates
as personhood and morality. Metaphysically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu
ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central
to the survival of communities. While it envelopes the key values of group solidarity,
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in
its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasizes respect
for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. 13
Thaddeus Metz has argued that the concept of Ubuntu has two elements embedded in it. That
is, ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity.’ 14 To identify with others entails thinking or seeing oneself as
integrated in the life of others. It is to think as a ‘we’, to orient one’s behaviour towards the
realization of shared ends. To fail to identify with each other entails alienation and undermining
each other. 15
On the other hand, solidarity is shown through people undertaking mutual aid and acting in
ways that are expected to benefit each other. 16 It is further shown in attitudes, emotions and
motives that show positive disposition towards others. To fail to show solidarity is to show
disinterest in each other flourishing and may mean ill-will, hostility and cruelty. 17 Identity and
solidarity are present together in ubuntu and are at the heart of the concept.
How does this concept of Ubuntu relate to the criminal justice system? There are at least two
factors that connect ubuntu to the criminal justice system. The first is that when one commits
a crime (such as rape, murder, kidnapping, theft, and assault), such a person can be said to have
acted in an unfriendly manner, in a manner that destroys the harmony of the community. By so
doing, the culprit is distancing himself or herself from the person s/he has injured, thereby
destroying the ‘we-ness’ or togetherness. He or she subordinates the other person instead of
identifying with the person and showing solidarity. 18
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When this happens, the community as a collective has a duty to restore this impaired harmony.
To achieve this, the community or the political authority of the community may impose some
burdensome compensation or burdensome rehabilitation on the culprit as a way of expressing
disapproval, but more importantly, to help the culprit realize his wrong and reconcile with the
community he has injured. 19 Metz argues that under Ubuntu, the goal of punishment is
reconciliation, to restore community harmony. Therefore, the burden or punishment imposed
on the offender must be proportional to the harm done, but above all, must not foreclose the
possibility of reconciliation and resuming harmonious relations.
The second point linking ubuntu to the criminal justice system, flowing from the first, is that
when applied to the criminal justice system, ubuntu would entail sentencing offenders in a
manner that avoids unfriendly opposites, that is, sentencing offenders in a manner that
forecloses the possibility of reconciliation. 20 Society’s response to an individual’s wrongdoing
should not lead to further divisions and ill-will. That way harmony cannot be restored. In
Metz’s view, under ubuntu, the only kind of sentence that is acceptable is that which is ‘only
necessary to counteract another’s own proportionate unfriendliness.’ 21 Punishment should not
be intended to annihilate an individual or to degrade his or her capacity for identity and
solidarity. Punishment should always leave room for reform and reconciliation, for re-growing
one’s humanness. A prison sentence of 105 years manifestly violates the concept of Ubuntu as
it takes away the possibility of restoration.
Finally, and in passing, it seems the Court of Appeal misapplied the law regulating the passing
of consecutive sentences. The Court thought there was need to stiffen the sentence because the
appellant was a religious leader who betrayed the trust reposed in him. In ordering the sentences
to run consecutively, the Court took the view that concurrent sentences could only be imposed
where the series of crimes formed a continuity of purpose. Because the crimes were committed
on different days, the Court thought there was no continuity of purpose (ironically the Court
relied on similar fact evidence to uphold the conviction).
This approach appears simplistic and incorrect. The law governing the imposition of
consecutive or concurrent sentences is found under section 15 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
which provides:
When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more distinct offences, the court may
sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which
such court is competent to impose; such punishments, when consisting of
imprisonment, to commence the one after the expiration of the other, in such order as
the court may direct, unless the court directs that such punishments shall run
concurrently.
The section empowers the Courts to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences for
distinct offences in one trial. It does not give circumstances that should be considered for a
court to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences. However, what is clear from the
provision is that there is no requirement for the offences to have been part of a continuing series
as a precondition for imposing concurrent sentences. Comparative jurisprudence in the
Thaddeus Metz, “Reconciliation As the Aim of a Criminal Trial: Ubuntu’s Implications for Sentencing,”
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common law demonstrates that the power to order consecutive sentencing is used sparingly as
it may in effect lead to sentences disproportional to the gravity of the offences committed by
the convict. The approach taken by the Court of Appeal, for example, could lead to a situation
where someone who stole several chickens on different days cumulatively attracting hundreds
of years in jail, which would be a clear jurisprudential absurdity as the sentence would be
manifestly disproportional to the nature of the offence. To avoid this absurdity, there are two
impositions that have evolved in jurisprudence on this issue. The first, is that when the offences
are part of a course of conduct, then the sentences should run concurrently and not
consecutively. The Court of Appeal position that this course of conduct abates if the offences
are committed on different days is incorrect. The principle applies both where the same or
similar offence is repeated against the same victim(s) or the same crime is committed but
against different victims even on different dates. There is no need for the offences to be
committed on the same day, although there may be need for the offences to have been
committed within a relatively short period of time. 22
The second restriction, which the Court of Appeal did not explore, is that the sentences should
not run consecutively where this will result into a disproportionately harsh sentence. On this
score, Professors John Hatchard and Muna Ndulo have thus argued that ‘the restriction on the
use of consecutive sentences is that such sentences should not be added together to produce an
aggregate sentence which is totally out of proportion to the gravity of the individual offences.
The court must look at the total course of behaviour and impose a sentence commensurate with
such behaviour.’ 23
For the foregoing reasons, it is humbly submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal to
sentence the appellant to 105 years is inconsistent with constitutional norms. The case
highlights the urgent need for reforming the sentencing law in Zambia. The judiciary could
lead the way in reforming the law either through propounding jurisprudence that wells-up from
the constitution and giving constitutional norms sinews and flesh in meting out sentences, or
by adopting sentencing guidelines for the entire judiciary.

John Hatchard and Muna Ndulo, Readings in Criminal Law and Criminology in Zambia (Multimedia
Publications, 1994) 111
23
Ibid, 111
22

11

